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2 1 INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
It is generally acknowleged that decentralization of many central government activities
to lower levels of government is desirable if jurisdictions are linked by high mobility of
households and firms. Mobility can force local authorities to take account of agents’
preferences (Tiebout 1956; McLure 1986).1 This suggests the need to understand local
governments’ behavior in lower-level jurisdictions such as counties, municipalities, town-
ships and districts. However, the framework provided by the traditional tax competition
literature is more tailored to competition between regions or states within a federation,
and little attention has been paid to the proper features of the sub-metropolitan level.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a tax competition model adapted to
the specific environment of low-level jurisdictions which enables investigation of the ef-
ficiency properties of sub-metropolitan tax competition in the context of mobile capital
and households.
Tax competition among sub-metropolitan governments (or municipalities) occurs
within a specific context of fiscal relations which differ from those typical of upper gov-
ernment layers. First, the municipality-level is characterized by high levels of household
interjurisdictional mobility. By comparison, individual mobility in response to short-run
public policy changes is much smaller across metropolitan areas and especially across
states, which is in line with the immobility hypothesis of Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986). This high mobility of the tax base in municipalities leads to
stronger tax competition between sub-metropolitan governments. Second, competition
among municipalities occurs within metropolitan areas composed of a large central ju-
risdiction and many small communities. While the center has some market power and
therefore can behave strategically, the vast majority of municipalities are atomistic.2
In this paper, the focus is on tax competition between atomistic jurisdictions. Several
recent contributions (see e.g. Janeba and Osterloh 2013; Gaigné et al. 2015) focus on
core-periphery relations.3 The third and most significant specificity of municipal level
is the dual nature of household mobility across jurisdictions. A mobile household typ-
ically chooses both a place of residence and a workplace, which potentially are located
in two different municipalities.4 Given this specific local environment, an analysis of
municipality governments decisions requires an appropriate theoretical framework.
There is a fairly large literature on the efficiency properties of federal systems when
firms - or more specifically capital - and households are mobile across jurisdictions.
1See, e.g., Oates et al. (1972), Wellisch (2006) and Wildasin (2013) for discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of decentralization of public policies.
2Brülhart et al. (2015) provide strong empirical evidence of a high level of urban fragmentation
within metropolitan areas (or "cities"). Atomisticity partly explains the lack of spatial interactions
between municipalities found in e.g.Lyytikäinen (2012),Isen (2014) and Baskaran (2014).
3See Brülhart et al. (2015) for a comprehensive overview of this recent literature.
4See e.g. McKenzie (2013) for empirical evidence of the significance of county-to-county commuting
in the United States.
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Early contributions were introduced by Wilson (1995), Richter and Wellisch (1996) and
Brueckner (2000). See Wellisch (2006) for a comprehensive review. The simplest models
involve small jurisdictions with policies that do not affect prices or utility in other juris-
dictions, perfectly mobile capital and residents-workers, and a fixed land factor.5 Local
governments provide congestible local public goods financed by various tax instruments.
A central result is that a residence-based head tax on mobile households to internalize
their congestion costs and an undistorsive tax on land to balance the local budget are
sufficient to achieve Pareto efficiency of the competitive equilibrium between jurisdic-
tions. Such an efficiency-supporting tax structure is qualified as complete. Richter and
Wellisch (1996) demonstrate that with the introduction of several firms and local impure
public factors this efficiency result still holds, provided that jurisdictions can raise local
poll taxes on mobile firms. Inefficiencies occur whenever one of these tax instruments is
unavailable or is replaced by a distortive tax.6
While the above contributions differ in important respects, they all assume that
mobile individuals work in their chosen residential location, and consequently, they
treat wage as a jurisdiction-specific variable. This makes the above models appropriate to
study tax competition between large jurisdictions such as regions or states.7 However, as
Braid (1996) notes, within a metropolitan area, having decided on a residential location,
households can commute to work anywhere in the metropolis, which equalizes wages
across jurisdictions. In Braid’s model, sub-metropolitan jurisdictions compete for mobile
capital and workers, but residents are assumed to be immobile. Conversely, Hoyt (1991),
Krelove (1993) and Wilson (1997) employ the model developed originally by Epple and
Zelenitz (1981) and Henderson (1985) to study the policy choices of sub-metropolitan
governments when households are free to choose their residential location; however, these
works ignore the location of labor and businesses.
This paper extends the tax competition model with residents’-workers’ mobility de-
veloped by Wilson (1995) and Richter and Wellisch (1996) (WRW hereafter) and investi-
gates the efficiency properties of tax competition between sub-metropolitan jurisdictions
when capital and households are mobile. There are two main features that distinguish
our model from the models in the literature. First, previous studies focus on workers’,
5While this paper is interested in households’ perfect mobility, which may be relevant at the municipal
level, other papers which investigate regional tax competition focus on imperfectly mobile households.
Based on the model proposed by Mansoorian and Myers (1993), several authors, such as Burbidge
and Myers (1994) and Wellisch (1994), study tax competition when individuals have different degrees
of home attachment. Bucovetsky (2011) studies the situation where households face a fixed uniform
mobility cost when moving from one jurisdiction to another.
6Wilson (1995) demonstrates that contrary to head taxes on households, labor taxes on individual
labor supply induce underprovision of public goods. Using Richter and Wellisch (1996)’s framework,
Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000) analyze the distortions induced by the absence of either an undistortive
tax on land or one of the direct taxes on households and firms.
7Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989) refer to this type of models as regional models, whereas they qualify
as metropolitan models, those that study tax competition within a metropolitan area.
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residents’ or workers’-residents’ mobility; the framework proposed here integrates both
residents’ and workers’ mobility as separate household choices. In lower-level jurisdic-
tions, this is empirically more relevant, and allows clarification of the role of each market
from the perspective of the local authorities.8 The second and most important char-
acteristic of this model is the presence of a common land market for households and
firms; the previous literature which considers both households’ and firms’ mobility, sees
land use as confined to firms. Specifically, in contrast to the WRW model which focuses
on labor markets, in low-level jurisdictions the interactions of interest between mobile
households and firms takes place in local land markets through land rent adjustments.
The other features of the model are standard. A federation consisting of a large number
of small jurisdictions is considered. Like residents and workers, capital is perfectly mo-
bile throughout the federation, while each jurisdiction is endowed with a fixed amount
of land. Each household owns an equal share of the federation’s total capital and land
endowments. Local authorities provide congestible public goods and pure public inputs
financed by endogenous multiple tax instruments.
Two decentralized equilibria are studied in this paper. In the first, local governments
are assumed to finance public expenditure by the levying of a residence-based head tax on
households and two source-based taxes on firms - a business capital tax, and a business
land tax.9 In the WRW framework, since all land serves as an input, the business land
tax which relies on a fixed factor, is undistortive. Thus the tax structure is complete,
a congestion fee is raised on households, capital is not taxed, and public services are
provided efficiently.10 This paper extends these findings allowing mobile residents also
to consume land, so that business land use becomes endogenous. Although each separate
tax is now distortive, the overall tax structure remains complete. A noteworthy change in
the first-best tax policy however occurs. To control the size of its residential population,
a jurisdiction needs to increase the head tax to above the marginal crowding cost: since
new residents necessarily replace firms on the local land market, and thereby erode the
business land tax base, they involve an additional marginal cost that also needs to be
internalized.
In practice, combining related tax bases saves on administration costs.11 Thus, it is
8A recent contribution by Gaigné et al. (2015) also integrates both residential and labor mobility
of households. The authors develop a urban economic model with asymmetric tax competition within
metropolitan areas. Contrary to the present paper which analyzes the efficiency properties of local
governments behaviors when jurisdictional boundaries are fixed, Gaigné et al. (2015)’s study focuses on
the optimal structure of metropolitan areas. Thus, their results should be regarded as complementary
to those in this paper.
9Business taxes are source-based since both local inputs are partially owned by non-residents.
10This corresponds to the first-best case in Wilson (1995). Similar outcomes are obtained by Wellisch
and Hulshorst (2000) in Richter and Wellisch’s (1996) framework with several firms involving congestion
but no capital. In their framework, due to firms congestion, the optimal poll business tax is a congestion
fee.
11Hettich and Winer (1988, 1999) characterize the optimal number of activities within a tax base,
accounting for the administrative and political costs. Another rationale for a combined tax is that it
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common for statutory restrictions to require local authorities to levy a single business
property tax rate on both capital and land inputs.12 Introducing a combined business
property tax appears to be a natural departure from the first-best tax structure (e.g.
Wilson 1984, 1995; Braid 1996). In the second decentralized equilibrium analyzed in
this paper, local governments may freely choose the levels of a single business property
tax levied on both capital and land inputs, and a head tax on residents. Our analysis
provides two new insights. First, the only tax distortion caused by the property tax is an
inefficiently low taxation of business land in order to attract mobile capital. Due to the
interactions between households and firms in local land markets, local authorities do not
need to compensate for this decline by increasing their tax on residents, which contrasts
with findings in the WRW framework.13 Second, this paper extends Wilson’s (1995)
focus on local public goods, to include local public inputs, and provides an optimal
second-best provision rule which reveals that local public inputs are provided so as to
balance the locational distortions caused by the property tax. It highlights the key role
of workers’s mobility in the choice of the local public input supply.14
Beyond the current analysis, the proposed model provides a basis from which to
examine the efficiency properties of various possible local tax systems; as such, it can be
relied on to address a number of issues related to optimal taxation in sub-metropolitan
jurisdictions in a decentralization context. In addition, our analysis suggests the need
for more empirical investigations of business property tax limitation reforms. Several
reforms resulting in capital being drastically limited or removed from the local combined
property tax base have been implemented in the United States (Ohio, 2005; Michigan,
2014) and in Europe (France, 2010). Empirical investigation of their impact on the
local tax mix and local provision of public services would provide new insights into tax
competition at the sub-metropolitan level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the general model. Section 3
characterizes efficient allocation in a metropolitan area and derives a baseline efficiency-
supporting tax system. Section 4 studies decentralized competitive equilibria with a
complete tax instrument set, and with a combined business property tax. Section 5
concludes.
might be difficult, in practice, to disentangle closely related tax bases. For instance, land improvements
which constitute a type of capital, are often integrated in the land tax base (Fisher, 2015).
12E.g. in the United States the legal restrictions in 40 out of the 50 states impose equal rates on real
property (land and buildings) and personal property (equipment, machinery, inventories...). (Source:
the online database published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2014).
13When regional authorities are constrained to use a combined business property tax, Wilson (1995)
shows that the distortions are balanced among all their tax instruments.
14This provision rule is in line with the results in Matsumoto and Sugahara (2014). Their framework
differs in several respects from the one proposed here, but the main difference is that we account for
the existence of an untaxed mobile factor (labor).
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2. The model
2.1. The economy
Consider a federation, which can be regarded as a metropolitan area, consisting of n
sub-metropolitan jurisdictions indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. The federation is exogenously
endowed with K units of capital. Its fixed total population is denoted P. Each jurisdic-
tion i is endowed with a fixed land supply Li, is inhabited by Ri mobile residents, and
hosts Wi mobile workers, such that
P =
n∑
i=1
Ri, (2.1a) P =
n∑
i=1
Wi, (2.1b)
Note that equations (2.1) make explicit a first distinguishing feature of this framework:
each of the Ri residents in jurisdiction i potentially could work in another jurisdiction, so
that Ri and Wi do not necessarily coincide at the level of jurisdiction i which contrasts
to what is postulated in the WRW framework. Relaxing this assumption allows us to
account for the fact that within a metropolitan area, residential location and workplace
decisions are separated.
Firms in community i produce a private numeraire good which can be consumed
anywhere in the metropolis. The production technology in jurisdiction i is described
by the well-behaved production function F i ≡ F (Wi,Ki, Li, zi), where the three private
factors Wi, Ki and Li respectively correspond to labor, capital and land, while zi is the
public input provided by community i. F i exhibits constant returns to scale in private
factors.15 Marginal products are positive and decreasing, and all factors are assumed
to exhibit two-by-two technological complementarity so that cross derivatives of F i are
positive.16 Since all capital is used in the federation, we have
K =
n∑
i=1
Ki. (2.2)
Each resident of community i derives utility from private consumption, a congestible
public good and one unit of land, which is inelastically demanded in the individual’s
jurisdiction of residence.17 Thus, a resident is characterized by the utility function U i ≡
15Making the alternative assumption that F i exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors including
the public input would not affect significantly the analysis in this paper, since the number of firms is
normalized to one (see Matsumoto, 1998). The case of constant returns to scale in private factors is
chosen for convenience and is usually considered as the empirically more relevant case (see footnote 45).
16The usual assumption that factors are complement in production is reasonable given the aggregation
of production.
17For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider housing construction so that households and firms use
land directly, and we assume that the individual demand for land is inelastic. In Hoyt (1991), Krelove
(1993) and Wilson (1997), housing production uses mobile capital and fixed land, and the individual
housing demand is elastic. Krelove shows that housing taxation entails usual distortions from optimal
commodity tax theory. See Wilson (2003) for a survey of this literature.
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U(xi, gi, Ri), where xi denotes private consumption, and gi is the level of congestible
public good provided by community i. U i is assumed to be increasing in the first two
arguments, and decreasing inRi due to congestion.18 The total cost function of providing
the local public good and input in community i is denoted by Ci ≡ C(gi, zi) which is and
expressed in units of the private good. Marginal costs are positive and nondecreasing.
To complete the description of the economy, since no vacant land is allowed, in each
jurisdiction i we have
Li = Ri + Li. (2.3)
The land use condition (2.3) reveals the second distinguishing characteristic of this
framework.19 In the WRW model, since households do not consume land, firms use
the entire local land as an input so that the model incorporates a fixed factor. In the
economy considered here, this assumption is relaxed and all private factors - labor,
capital and land - are variable.
2.2. Private behavior
Households, both as residents and workers, are assumed to be perfectly mobile within
the federation. As residents, households decide on a location which will maximize their
utility. They incur no mobility cost so that free migrations equate utility levels across
jurisdictions:
U(xi, gi, Ri) = U(xj , gj , Rj) (2.4)
for all i, j in {1, . . . , n}.
As a worker, each individual is endowed with one unit of labor, inelastically supplied
in the jurisdiction of the federation which offers the highest wage. Costless commuting
entails that the same exogenous wage w prevails throughout the federation.20 Moreover,
each resident of the federation possesses an identical fraction of the total capital endow-
ment K which she invests in the jurisdiction where she receives the highest return. Since
capital is perfectly mobile across jurisdictions, in equilibrium the same return to capital
r prevails across the whole federation. Also, land ownership is shared equally among
all metropolis residents. From the perspective of a small jurisdiction, the wage rate w
and the capital return r are exogenous. However, since local land endowments are fixed,
18Empirical evidence of congestion are provided in Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom
and Goodman (1973). See also McMillan et al. (1981) and Edwards (1990).
19Notice also that there may be differences in local land endowments Li. This paper is in fact not
restricted to the study of symmetric equilibria across jurisdictions.
20Commuting is a noticeable departure from the WRW framework in which costless commuting is
not allowed. Thus, in the WRW model, the benefits of local policies capitalize into the wage rate which
is an endogenous jurisdiction-specific variable. This explains the central role of local labor markets in
this literature.
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the land rent ρi is endogenous and specific to jurisdiction i. All prices are expressed in
terms of the numeraire good. Based on the above, the real income of an individual is
y = w +
rK +∑ni=1 ρiLi
P (2.5)
which indicates that the individual income is independent of the jurisdiction of residence.
Households use their income to consume the private good xi and their one-unit land use,
paying the land rent ρi. The local government i collects a residence-based head tax τRi .
Because individuals consume a single unit of land, τRi can be interpreted either as a unit
tax on land consumption or as a head tax. The budget constraint of a representative
resident of jurisdiction i can be written as
xi + ρi = y − τRi (2.6)
Firms choose labor Wi, capital Ki and land Li as to maximize profits F i − wWi −
(r + τKi )Ki − (ρi + τLi )Li, where τKi and τLi are respectively the unit taxes on capital
and business land use in community i.21 Factor prices and taxes are taken as given by
firms. Profit maximization implies
F iW = w (2.7)
F iK = r + τ
K
i , (2.8)
F iL = ρi + τ
L
i , (2.9)
that is, firms’ competitive behavior equalizes marginal factor products and factor prices.
Constant returns to scale result in
F i − wWi − (r + τKi )Ki − (ρi + τLi )Li = 0, (2.10)
which means that there is no profit opportunity at equilibrium.
The local public sector must satisfy the following budget constraint:
τRi Ri + τ
K
i Ki + τ
L
i Li = C(gi, zi). (2.11)
that is, tax revenues collected from residents, business capital and business land use
must cover the costs of public services provision.
3. Pareto efficiency
Before studying potential distortions of decentralization, we derive a baseline Pareto-
efficient allocation of production factors, households and public services within the feder-
ation. Since we are interested in allocations that are compatible with costless migrations
21For reasons of space the framework does not consider local taxes on labor inputs. However, as
discussed below, the results can easily be extended to labor taxes.
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of residents, the central planner’s choice has to rule out interjurisdictional utility dif-
ferentials.22 Therefore, the planner’s program consists of choosing a feasible allocation
which maximizes utility in a jurisdiction, say 1, under the resource constraints (2.1)-(2.3)
and the migration equilibrium condition (2.4):
maximize U(x1, g1, R1)
choosing xi, gi, zi, Ri, Wi, Ki and Li subject to (2.1)-(2.4) and
n∑
i=1
F (Wi,Ki, Li, zi) =
n∑
i=1
[Rixi + C(gi, zi)], (3.1)
where condition (3.1) is the feasibility constraint of the economy: global output has to
cover households’ private consumption and the costs of providing public services.
It is straightforward to prove that the necessary conditions for the central planner’s
problem then result in
Ri
|U iR|
U ix
+ F iL + xi = Rj
|U jR|
U jx
+ F jL + xj , (3.2)
F iK = F
j
K , (3.3)
F iW = F
j
W , (3.4)
Ri
U ig
U ix
= Cig, (3.5)
F iz = C
i
z, (3.6)
for all i, j in {1, . . . , n},
where subscripts stand for derivatives and | . | denotes absolute value.23 Rules (3.2),
(3.3) and (3.4) define the efficient allocations of residents, capital and workers across
jurisdictions. Condition (3.2) states that the efficient residential allocation of individuals
across jurisdictions requires that the costs of a marginal resident are equalized among
communities. There are three kinds of such costs.24 First, when entering a jurisdiction,
a new resident decreases the utility of all residents in i due to congestion: Ri|U iR|/U ix.
Second, she replaces a unit of business land and thus, reduces the jurisdiction’s output by
F iL. Third, she consumes xi units of the private good. Unlike residents, marginal capital
and workers involve benefits, their marginal products F iK and F
i
W but no cost. According
to condition (3.3) and (3.4), the efficient allocations of capital and labor require that their
respective marginal benefits are equalized among jurisdictions. Conditions (3.5) and
22This approach considers that the social planner cannot directly control migrations and is consistent
with most studies with household mobility (e.g. Myers and Papageorgiou 1993; Richter and Wellisch
1996; Wellisch 2006; Wildasin 2013).
23An appendix is available from the author upon request detailing the derivations of (3.2)-(3.6).
24Alternatively, as shown by the land market clearing condition (2.3), condition (3.2) also characterizes
the efficient location of business land.
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(3.6) characterize the efficient supplies of local public services. According to condition
(3.5), the efficient provision of the local public good gi satisfies the usual Samuelson
condition: the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for the local public good of i’s
residents (on the left-hand side - LHS) equates to its marginal cost (on the on the right-
hand side - RHS). As stated by condition (3.6), a similar requirement characterizes the
efficient level of public input: the marginal product of the public input on the RHS must
be equal to its marginal cost on the LHS.
The efficient allocation characterized in (3.3)-(3.5) highlights several features of low-
level jurisdictions which are essential for this analysis. At first, conditions (3.2) and (3.4)
show that residents and workers assume very different roles at the sub-metropolitan level.
On the one hand, new residents in a jurisdiction entail only social and economic costs
since they conduct no local productive activity. On the other hand, inflows of new work-
ers, who do not consume public goods, bring nothing but benefits - from a jurisdiction
perspective, labor plays a role similar to that of capital.25 Another distinguishing char-
acteristic of the sub-metropolitan level is highlighted by the presence of the marginal
product F iL in (3.2). It is specific to the interaction among households and firms through
their use of a common local land. Thus, in contrast to the WRW model, even in the
absence of congestion, residents are still costly from the jurisdiction’s viewpoint. This
is expected to increase the incentive for the local authorities to levy higher taxes on
residents to internalize this specific marginal opportunity cost. This is explored further
in section 4.
The above characterization of efficient allocation was derived assuming that the
central planner’s choices replace the agents decision-making process. Although enlight-
ening from a theoretical point of view, the efficiency conditions obtained in this way
can hardly be compared with the outcomes of decentralized equilibria in which local
authorities cannot directly control the economic variables. Thus, suppose now that the
central planner aims to implement the efficient allocation characterized in (3.2)-(3.6),
choosing (τRi , τ
K
i , τ
L
i , gi, zi)i∈J1,nK and accounting for the private behaviors described in
section 2. The efficiency conditions change to:
25This should be compared to the case of higher-level jurisdictions. In this case, conditions (3.2)
and (3.4) are merged, reflecting the fact that residents are not only costly but also generate some local
benefits through their marginal productivity F iW (e.g. Richter and Wellisch, 1996).
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Result 1. Efficient local tax system and public services provision, in a metropolitan area
where the public policy instruments set {τRi , τKi , τLi , gi, zi} is available, are characterized
by
τRi −Ri
|U iR|
U ix
− τLi = τRj −Rj
|U jR|
U jx
− τLj , (3.7)
τKi = τ
K
j , (3.8)
Ri
U igi
U ix
= Cig, (3.9)
F iz = C
i
z, (3.10)
and business land taxes τLi are set so as to clear the local budget restrictions (2.11),
for all i, j in {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to condition (3.7), an efficient location of residents and business land
within the federation requires that the net marginal benefits of residents between ju-
risdictions are equalized. When entering community i, a new resident brings in τRi
additional tax revenues but generates a congestion cost Ri|U iR|/U ix and a marginal fiscal
cost τLi . This second cost stems from the crowding out of a unit of business land by the
new resident which reduces the tax revenues from τLi . The marginal fiscal cost of house-
holds which is a central aspect of the present study, reflects the specific interaction of
households and firms on local land introduced - similar to the F iL term in (3.2). Condi-
tion (3.7) thus extends the net marginal benefits equalization rule for efficient location of
residents derived in the WRW model (Wellisch, 2006). Similarly, condition (3.8) states
that for capital to locate efficiently, the net marginal benefits of capital location have
to be equalized across jurisdictions. Since capital involves no marginal cost, efficiency
requires a uniform taxation of capital throughout the federation.26 Finally, conditions
(3.9) and (3.10) simply restate the Samuelson rules for efficient public services provision.
Thus, an efficient allocation can be achieved provided that local governments behave
according to the conditions derived in Result 1. However, it remains an open question
to what extent decentralized local governments decisions do lead to efficiency. Section 4
addresses this issue.
4. Decentralized equilibria with multiple tax instruments
In order to analyze the efficiency properties of decentralized equilibria when local gov-
ernments choose their tax policies and their supply of local public services, we consider a
26Notice that the symmetric role of capital and labor in this economy allows one to deduce that any
uniform level of local labor tax would ensure an efficient location of workers across jurisdictions. This
requirement is met since the absence of a labor tax can be considered a uniform zero-tax on labor.
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metropolis comprised of a large number, n, of atomistic jurisdictions. Thus, any jurisdic-
tion perceives the choices made in other communities as independent of its own decisions.
In the sequel, attention is focused on a representative jurisdiction i. In subsection 4.1,
local governments behavior is specified. Subsection 4.2 characterizes optimal local public
policies when the tax instrument set is comprised of three taxes on respectively residents,
capital and business land use. In subsection 4.3 a decentralized equilibrium in which
the two latter taxes are replaced by a single business property tax on both capital and
business land use is analyzed.
4.1. Local governments behavior
4.1.1. Location decisions
Household and capital locations are not under the direct control of local government.
However, a rational government must take account of location responses to its pol-
icy. The first analytical step then is to characterize the decentralized location deci-
sions of households and capital from the perspective of jurisdiction i. It might be
helpful at this stage to review the model variables: {ρi;Wi;Ri;Li;Ki} are endoge-
nous economic variables in jurisdiction i; {τRi ; τKi ; τLi ; gi; zi} are control variables for
local government i; {Li;w; r;P} are exogenous from jurisdiction i’s perspective where
Li is the land endowment specific to jurisdiction i, w and r are the prices prevailing
in the entire metropolis, and P is the federal population. Finally, for community i
{ρj ;Wj ;Rj ;Lj ;Kj ;τRj ;τ
K
j ;τ
L
j ;gj ;zj ;Lj} are exogenous if j 6= i.
In equilibrium, households are indifferent between residing in community i or in some
other community j. Thus, utility is further equated across jurisdictions. Integrating the
household’s budget constraint (2.6) into the free mobility condition (2.4), it follows that
from jurisdiction i’s viewpoint, a migration equilibrium is defined by the n− 1 bilateral
relations:
U(y − ρi − τRi , gi, Ri) = U(y − ρj − τRj , gj , Rj) (4.1)
for all j = 1, . . . , n such that j 6= i,
where y is as defined by (2.5). The presence of the individual’s income on the RHS
of (4.1) shows that decisions made in jurisdiction i affect the level of utility enjoyed
by its residents whether they continue to reside in i or move to some other community
j. Wherever a resident chooses to settle, she will still own her initial share Li/P of
jurisdiction i’s land endowment. Hence, any variation in the local land rent ρi will
affect her income, and thereby her welfare, regardless of her location. However, since
the equilibrium bundle (x, g,R) usually differs between jurisdictions, a given change in
ρi will have a different effect on the utility of a resident initially living in i depending
on the jurisdiction chosen for relocation.27 These differentiated income effects might
27A given increase (decrease) in the individual’s income will, ceteris paribus, increase (reduce) the
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make it technically demanding to characterize households’ location responses to local
policy changes. However, they are fairly peripheral to this analysis since they are not a
major determinant of households’ location choices in practice. Therefore, the following
analysis is restricted to the reasonable case where any such effects are ignored by mobile
households:
Assumption 1. The function U satisfies the following condition: ∂U∂x (x, g,R) =
∂U
∂x (x
′, g′, R′), for all bundles (x, g,R) and (x′, g′, R′) such that U(x, g,R) = U(x′, g′, R′).
An example of utility function which satisfies the above assumption is the common
class of additively-separable functions, U(x, g,R) = x + v(g,R).28 Assumption 1 guar-
antees that any marginal change in the individual’s income has a neutral effect on the
migration equilibrium (4.1). That is, mobile residents perceive that income, and there-
fore the utility prevailing in other jurisdictions, are exogenous. In formal terms, to derive
population reactions to its policy, local government i considers the following modified
migration equilibrium condition:
U(y¯ − ρi − τRi , gi, Ri) = u¯, (4.2)
where y¯ and u¯ are some exogenous variables from the representative jurisdiction’s view-
point. Thus, the responses of capital Ki, residents Ri and workers Wi to changes in
local government’s policy instruments τRi , τ
K
i , τ
L
i , gi and zi can be derived from the
necessary conditions for the optimal demand for labor (2.7) and capital (2.8) from local
firms, and the migration equilibrium condition (4.2). Inserting (2.3) and (2.9) into (2.7),
(2.8) and (4.2), we obtain the following three-equation system in Ki, Wi and Ri:
FW (Wi,Ki,Li −Ri, zi)− w = 0, (4.3)
FK(Wi,Ki,Li −Ri, zi)− τKi − r = 0, (4.4)
U [y¯ − FL(Wi,Ki,Li −Ri, zi)− τi, gi, Ri]− u¯ = 0, (4.5)
where τi ≡ τRi − τLi is the tax spread between households and business land taxes. It
represents the tax revenue generated by a resident net of her marginal fiscal cost. The
three locational conditions (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) allow us to derive Ki, Wi and Ri as
implicit functions of τi, τKi , τ
L
i , gi and zi.
4.1.2. Local government objective
Local authorities in jurisdiction i are assumed to maximize the utility of a representative
resident, U(xi, gi, Ri). Note that despite households’ perfect mobility, the community
satisfaction the residents living in the community, and especially since the equilibrium amount of the
local public good is higher (lower) than private consumption - assuming diminishing marginal rate of
substitution.
28Additive-separability is a widespread hypothesis in tax competition models. However, utility need
not be linear in consumption. E.g., Assumption 1 holds also for U(x, g,R) = Φ[x+ v(g,R)], whenever
Φ is a bijective function, which is guaranteed by the usual assumptions: Φ is continuous and Φ′ > 0.
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perceives that it can influence the level of satisfaction of its residents since, in contrast
to mobile households, local government takes account of the effects of marginal income
changes on its residents’ satisfaction. Since households ignore these effects when deciding
on a residential location, changes in the jurisdiction’s policy instruments induce varia-
tions in utility which are not offset completely by households’ subsequent migrations.
It follows also that the utility-maximizing local government’s objective boils down to
maximizing the local net land rent ρiLi, which allows us to state that:
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If jurisdictions are small and residents
are perfectly mobile, then a utility-maximizing local government aims at maximizing the
net land rent in its jurisdiction.
Proof. Consider the impact of a small local policy change on the representative resident’s
utility. Inserting the budget constraint (2.6) into the utility function and accounting for
the free mobility condition (4.2), total differentiation of U i yields dU i = U ixdy+ dU(y¯−
ρi − τRi , gi, Ri) = U ixdy + du¯ = U ixdy, since du¯ = 0. That is, the only channel through
which policy can increase utility is income variations; residents mobility compensates for
any other effect. Using the income definition (2.5), the marginal utility change can be
written as dU i = U ix
Li
P dρi. Thus, any utility gain resulting from the incremental policy
is due to an increase in the return to domestic landowners.
According to Lemma 1, local governments pursue a policy favoring local landowners.
This is consistent with most models of tax competition among many small jurisdictions
in the presence of perfect mobility of residents (e.g. Henderson 1985; Hoyt 1991; Krelove
1993; Wilson 1995; Wellisch 2006).29 In this paper, land-rent-maximizing behavior stems
from household perfect mobility. However, there can be other reasons for this behavior.
Following Bucovetsky (1995), it could be argued that landowners constitute a majority
of the voter residents in a number of local jurisdictions. Moreover, their greater interest
in the community may explain that they are more prone to lobbying local authorities
compared to non-landowners.
4.2. First-best policy
We assume first that local governments can use three different tax instruments: a head
tax on households τRi , a unit tax on capital τ
K
i and a unit tax on business land use
τLi . In what follows, we assume without loss of generality that the local tax instrument
set is {τi; τKi ; τLi }. Local public policies are thus constrained by the following budget
29The result stated in Lemma 1 requires a separation of individuals’ decisions as consumers and
landowners. It is ensured by the neutrality hypothesis (Assumption 1) introduced in this paper. Other
approaches are also possible. For example, Wilson (1995) and Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000) assume
an Arrow-Debreu separation, while Henderson (1985) assumes that the local policy is conducted by
absentee landowners. Alternatively, Hoyt (1991) postulates that the policy instruments are controlled
by some immobile landowners who aim at maximizing their net wealth.
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restriction:
τiRi + τ
K
i Ki + τ
L
i Li = C(gi, zi), (4.6)
where the definition of τi and (2.3) are used to substitute respectively for τRi and Li
into (2.11). Written in this form, the budget constraint shows that local government i
considers its tax instrument set as composed of two taxes on mobile tax bases - the net
tax on residents τi and the capital tax τKi - and a tax τ
L
i levied on the fixed total land
endowment. Note that the business land tax remains a distortive tax since it still alters
the demand for land from local firms. However, the budget constraint (4.6) reveals that
local authorities use the distortive tax on residents to offset any change in tax revenues
caused by business land use variations, so that they can use τLi as if it were undistortive.
Let us consider in the sequel that the local government freely chooses τi, τKi , gi and
zi, while τLi adjusts endogenously so as to satisfy (4.6). From Lemma 1 the objective of
the local government is to maximize the local net land rent ρiLi. Using the land market
clearing condition (2.3), the zero-profit requirement (2.10) and replacing ρi with (2.9),
local government i’s objective can be rewritten as follows:
Ωi ≡ ρiLi = F i + F iLRi − wWi − (r + τKi )Ki − τLi Li. (4.7)
Using the budget constraint (4.6) to substitute τLi into (4.7), it follows that the local
government’s problem is to maximize
F (Wi,Ki,Li −Ri, zi)− wWi − rKi + [FL(Wi,Ki,Li −Ri, zi) + τi]Ri
− C(gi, zi) (4.8)
choosing τi, τKi , gi and zi, where Wi, Ki and Ri depend on the policy instruments so as
to satisfy (4.3)-(4.5). The first-order conditions for optimal local government behavior
are
dΩi
dti
=
(
τi +Ri
U iR
U ix
)
∂Ri
∂ti
+ τKi
∂Ki
∂ti
+
(
Ri
U ig
U ix
− Cig
)
∂gi
∂ti
+
(
F iz − Ciz
) ∂zi
∂ti
= 0 (4.9)
with ti ∈ {τi; τKi ; gi; zi}, and ∂ti∂t′i =
1 if ti = t′i0 otherwise.
In other words, conditions (4.9) indicate that local government i chooses each policy
instrument so as to equalize the marginal benefits and marginal costs it induces, while
taking account of economic agents’ mobility.30 The location responses of residents and
capital to changes in any policy variable ti, ∂Ri/∂ti, ∂Wi/∂ti and ∂Ki/∂ti can be derived
by total differentiation of the locational system (4.3)-(4.5). Their signs are summarized
below:
30The detailed derivation of the necessary conditions (4.9) is provided in Appendix B.
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Lemma 2. The equilibrium responses of residents, workers and capital to changes in
the policy instruments have the following signs:
∂Ri
∂ti
< 0 and
∂Ki
∂ti
,
∂Wi
∂ti
> 0, for ti ∈ {τi; zi},(i)
∂Ri
∂ti
> 0 and
∂Ki
∂ti
,
∂Wi
∂ti
< 0, for ti ∈ {τKi ; gi}.(ii)
Proof. See Appendix B, for the detailed derivation of the location responses.31
Lemma 2 depicts the way political decisions affect the location choices of mobile
households and capital in equilibrium. It states that an increase in the net tax on
residents induces an outflow (resp. inflow) of residents (resp. capital and labor). A
decrease in public good provision has the same impact. A higher capital tax decreases
(resp. increases) the equilibrium quantity of capital and labor (resp. number of resi-
dents). Decreasing the public input supply entails similar effects.
The equilibrium location responses require some comment. Notice first, that since
τLi does not appear in the locational system (4.3)-(4.5), changes to the business land
tax have no impact on population or capital provided that the tax spread between τRi
and τLi is unchanged. This confirms that even relaxing the hypothesis of a fixed land
factor which is usual in the WRW framework, the business land tax τLi can still be
used as an undistortive tax. Second, all responses of private inputs used by firms -
labor, capital and land - are in the same direction. This result follows directly from
the hypothesis of technological complementarity among inputs.32 Thus, although the
framework does not account explicitly for the number of firms (unlike that proposed by
Richter and Wellisch (1996) for example) the intuition of firms’ location is maintained.
The last and essential comment highlights the main novel insight provided by this pa-
per: whatever the instrument used, local authorities face a systematic trade-off between
attracting residents, therefore driving out firms, and vice versa. This trade-off reflects
the interactions of households and firms in local land markets. For example, by cutting
household taxation, local government attracts new residents. This inflow exerts upward
pressure on the local land rent which in turn, reduces the local demand for business
land and induces capital and labor outflows. This compromise is specific to lower-level
jurisdictions, and therefore is not part of the WRW model. At the regional level, where
residents and workers cannot be dissociated, the flow of worker-residents usually follows
the flow of firms (see e.g. Wellisch and Hulshorst, 2000).
Inserting the location responses into the necessary conditions (4.9), we obtain the
following result:
31Derivation of the location responses requires that the local public good involve congestion, U iR < 0,
as assumed in this paper (see footnote 56). This requirement must be met since all factors are variable;
in the WRW model, deriving the location responses requires the presence of a fixed production factor.
32This locational scheme of private inputs is not specific to the present framework. Lemma 1 in Braid
(1996) depicts the same pattern and similar findings can be derived from Wilson’s (1995) framework.
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Result 2. In equilibrium, under perfect interjurisdictional competition, local government
i chooses τRi , τ
K
i , τ
L
i , gi and zi in accordance with the following decision rules:
τRi = Ri
|U iR|
U ix
+ τLi , (4.10)
τKi = 0, (4.11)
Ri
U ig
U ix
= Cig, (4.12)
F iz = C
i
z, (4.13)
while satisfying the budget restriction (4.6), so that
τLi =
Ri
Li
(
Ci
Ri
−Ri |U
i
R|
U ix
)
. (4.14)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Conditions (4.10)-(4.13) characterize the behavior of any jurisdiction in the federa-
tion, so that the efficiency conditions (3.7)-(3.10) are satisfied in the decentralized equi-
librium. Notice also that following condition (4.14), whenever the marginal congestion
cost of public services Ri|U iR|/U ix exceeds the per capita cost Ci/Ri, the business land
tax is negative and thus, becomes a subsidy, and the tax on residents can be charged
at below the marginal congestion cost according to condition (4.10). However, it is well
known that when provision of local public services entails marginal costs that exceed
average costs, private markets are expected to supply local public services efficiently
(Boadway, 1980).33 This paper focuses on public services which require a public supply:
Assumption 2. (scale economies) The marginal congestion cost is lower than the
average cost of local public goods, so that Ri|U iR|/U ix < Ci/Ri.
Assumption 2 is common in tax competition models dealing with household mobil-
ity.34 It implies that an efficient tax instrument set cannot be reduced to a head tax
on residents: in order to dedicate this tax to controlling their population size, local
governments need another instrument to finance public services. This is precisely the
role of the business land tax τLi , as apparent in condition (4.14).
35 Nonetheless, due
to the trade-off faced by local authorities between hosting households and hosting firms
(Lemma 2), τLi also constitutes an additional cost for welcoming new residents. Accord-
ing to condition (4.10), local governments have incentives to choose household taxation
33The proof of this common result adapted to the present framework is available in an additional
appendix, available from the author upon request.
34See e.g. Wilson (1995), Richter and Wellisch (1996) and Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000).
35The Ri/Li term in (4.14) - which can be written also as 1 − Li/Li - simply recalls that from
a budgetary perspective, broadening a tax base allows to lower the related tax rate. However, this
budgetary effect is of minor importance to this analysis.
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in order to internalize the two marginal costs involved by an additional resident: the
congestion cost Ri|U iR|/U ix and the marginal fiscal opportunity cost τLi caused by the
erosion of the business land tax base.36 In addition, since capital generates no con-
gestion, the optimal capital tax is zero as (4.11) shows. This confirms that atomistic
jurisdictions using multiple tax instrument sets have no incentives to tax capital (Bu-
covetsky and Wilson, 1991). Note also that since workers involve no congestion, any
additional local source-based tax on labor, either on firms or on households, would also
be set at zero by the local authorities.37 Finally, conditions (4.12) and (4.13) indicate
that local public services are provided efficiently. The main findings from this subsection
can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose that local governments control τRi , τ
K
i , τ
L
i , gi and zi. Then,
the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by
(i) a tax on residents that exceeds the marginal congestion cost of residents to inter-
nalize their marginal fiscal cost,
(ii) a zero-tax on capital,
(iii) efficient provision of local public goods and factors.
Proposition 1 generalizes the usual first-best results of the WRW model and offers two
new insights.38 First, in the literature, a complete tax structure requires taxes to in-
ternalize the mobility costs of agents and an undistortive tax, usually levied on a fixed
production factor. Proposition 1 extends this result to a tax instrument set composed
solely of distortive taxes. The explanation for this result is that in the absence of vacant
land, a local government can levy taxes on its entire fixed land endowment using sepa-
rate taxes on residents and business land use. Notice that the household tax plays a dual
role - being a part of the undistortive tax but also an instrument to control residents’
mobility. The second novel insight is related to the identification of a new marginal
cost of household mobility, namely the marginal fiscal cost of residents. This cost which
highlights the fact that local authorities face a constant trade-off between hosting firms
and hosting households (Lemma 2), provides a new rationale for the heavy reliance on
36Notice that τRi and τLi play a symmetric role from the local government’s viewpoint. Alternatively
τRi can be used to clear the budget and τLi to internaternalize the net marginal fiscal cost of business
land use τRi −Ri|U iR|/U ix. In this case, the level of τLi is defined by (4.10) and the level of τRi is obtained
by inserting (4.10) into (4.14). This symmetry has important impications when the tax structure is
constrained (subsection 4.3).
37Allowing workers to cause congestion would not change the results of this paper, provided that a
local tax on labor is also introduced to allow local authorities to internalize this additional cost.
38The conditions stated in Result 2 are essentially the same as the first-best results discussed in
Wilson (1995) (section 3). However, Wilson’s results exclude two elements: (1) the marginal fiscal cost
τLi in (4.10); (2) condition (4.13) since his analysis focuses on local public goods. Result 2 can be seen
also as an extension of the optimal behavioral rules in Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000) (section 2).
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local household taxes observed in practice, apart from congestion costs which might be
quite low and difficult to measure by the local authority.
4.3. A household tax and a business property tax
Let us now consider the case where local governments are not allowed to levy separate
taxes on capital and land factors. The purpose is to derive the distortions expected from
such a constrained tax instrument set, and explain why local governments decide to de-
part from efficiency. Local governments are assumed to use two different tax instruments
only: a head tax on residents τRi and a business property tax τ
P
i which consists in a unit
tax on both capital and land factors.39 Local government i is assumed, without loss of
generality, to control the tax instrument set {τi; τPi }, where τi ≡ τRi − τPi . Therefore,
its budget constraint becomes:
τiRi + τ
P
i (Ki + Li) = C(gi, zi). (4.15)
It is assumed that while τi, gi and zi are chosen freely, τPi adjusts to clear (4.15). Using
the budget constraint to substitute τPi into (4.7) - where τ
K
i and τ
L
i are replaced by
τPi - results in (4.8). Thus, the local government’s objective does not change, and the
optimal choices of τi, gi and zi are still characterized by the necessary conditions (4.9).
Only the location responses of households and capital differ from the first-best case.
Inserting them into the first order conditions, we derive the following result:
Result 3. In equilibrium, under perfect interjurisdictional competition, local govern-
ments choose τRi , τ
P
i , gi and zi in accordance with the following decision rules:
τRi = Ri
|U iR|
U ix
+
(
1 +
Ki
Li
)
τPi , (4.16)
Ri
U ig
U ix
= Cig, (4.17)
F iz − Ciz
Ki
= εi
[
F iKz − F iLz + (F iKW − F iLW )
∂Wi
∂zi
∣∣∣∣
(K¯i,L¯i)
]
, (4.18)
while satisfying the budget restriction (4.15), so that
τPi = (1− κi)
Ri
Li
(
Ci
Ri
−Ri |U
i
R|
U ix
)
, (4.19)
where κi ≡ Ki/(Ki+Li) denotes the capital share in the business property and εi < 0, its
elasticity with respect to τPi ; and (∂Wi/∂zi)|(K¯i,L¯i) > 0 is workers’ reaction to a public
input increase, given Ki and Li.
Proof. See Appendix D.
39Wilson (1995) and Braid (1996) investigate a similar combined tax which they refer to as a "business
property tax". We retain this terminology in our paper and refer to the sum Ki + Li as "business
property".
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The competitive equilibrium with a combined business property tax is thus charac-
terized by an inefficient allocation - compared to conditions (3.7)-(3.10). To interpret
the behavioral rules stated in Result 3, it must be emphasized that, under Assumption 2,
condition (4.19) requires the property tax τPi to be positive. That is, jurisdictions are
not able to balance their budget without taxing mobile capital, as was possible with two
separate business taxes on capital and land. Local governments consequently decide to
distort their policy instruments to compensate for this overtaxation of mobile capital.
The first of these distortions appears in the choice of the property tax itself. Condition
(4.19) shows first that, except in the rare case of a perfectly symmetric equilibrium,
property tax levels are intended to differ across jurisdictions, which entails a misalloca-
tion of capital in the federation (condition (3.8) is violated).40 Interestingly, condition
(4.19) offers further information about the causes of this misallocation. It shows that,
ceteris paribus, jurisdictions with lower desired business land taxes - as defined by the
first-best decision rule (4.14) - and those with more capital-intensive firms are expected
to set more attractive tax rates on capital. More generally, condition (4.19) provides a
fresh and fairly intuitive characterization of combined business property taxes:
Proposition 2. Suppose that local business taxes on capital and business land use are
combined into a single local business property tax. Then:
(i) the property tax level τPi is chosen between the first-best desired levels of the two
taxes it combines, τKi and τ
L
i , defined respectively by (4.11) and (4.14);
(ii) the higher the capital (land) share in the overall business property of community i,
the more τPi acts as a capital (land) tax.
Proposition 2 indicates that tax competition for mobile capital is fiercer between juris-
dictions with highly capital intensive firms, which puts downward pressure on business
tax rates.41 In other words, the more mobile the tax base of the combined property tax
(higher capital share in the business property), the lower its rate.
Comparing condition (4.16) to the first-best decision rule (4.10), indicates that when
choosing their household tax levels, local governments treat property taxes and business
land taxes in a similar vein. However, the tax on residents now has to internalize an
additional marginal fiscal cost τPi Ki/Li. Again, since this distortion need not be the
same in every jurisdiction, residents and thus, business land use are misallocated in the
federation (condition (3.7) is violated). The intuition behind this suboptimal behavior
is straightforward. Consider a small decrease in the household tax allowing community
i to attract a new resident. This entry now deprives the jurisdiction of tax revenue for
40In this framework, a symmetric decentralized equilibrium is all the less likely since jurisdictions
potentially have different initial land endowments Li.
41To our knowledge, the literature does not provide such a characterization of combined business
property taxes. Most studies focus on the distortions caused by a tax structure incorporating a business
property tax, without deriving its explicit level.
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two reasons. First, the new resident replaces a unit of business land which entails a loss
of τPi , as in the first-best case. Second, due to the complementarity between capital and
land (F iKL > 0), this decrease in business land use is accompanied by an outflow ofKi/Li
units of capital, which also reduces local tax revenues since mobile capital is now taxed at
a positive rate.42 In other words, by increasing the costs of hosting residents, combined
taxation of capital and business land, leads local governments to charge inefficiently
high household taxes with respect to business land taxation. This distortion is larger in
jurisdictions with highly capital-intensive firms, because they incur higher marginal fiscal
costs when new residents crowd out local firms. Here, we are interested in the extent
to which local governments actually increase the household tax level. To address this,
recall that business property taxes are usually lower than business land taxes, especially
in jurisdictions with more capital intensive firms (Proposition 2). This should in part at
least, offset the increase in the marginal fiscal cost of residents. Integrating (4.14) and
(4.19) respectively into (4.10) and (4.16) reveals that τRi is not distorted, which can be
summarized in:
Proposition 3. Suppose that local business taxes on capital and business land use are
combined into a single local business property tax. Then, despite the increase in the
marginal fiscal cost of residents due to the positive taxation of capital, local governments
have no incentive to distort local taxes on residents.
Thus, jurisdictions have no incentive to tax mobile residents too heavily, since by low-
ering their property taxes in order to attract mobile capital, they reduce the increased
marginal fiscal cost of mobile residents to its optimal first-best value. Although the
introduction of a business property tax distorts the allocation of residents and business
land across jurisdictions, the setting of household local taxes is not distorted. That
is, local governments distort only the tax instrument that has been constrained. This
result contrasts with the analysis in Wilson (1995) which shows that regional authorities
balance the distortions between the tax on residents and the property tax. The reason
for this difference is that at the sub-metropolitan level, due to the compromise between
residents and firms, the tax on residents and the tax on business land play a symmetric
role: each of these taxes can be used to internalize the other one, while the other tax
allows to clear the local budget.43 Thus, in a constrained environment, local authori-
ties have no incentive to distort both instruments and distort only the most appropriate
one.44 Here, the objective of attracting more capital can be achieved directly by lowering
τPi . Hence, it is not necessary to distort τ
R
i .
According to condition (4.17) local governments have no incentive to distort the
42Since, inputs prices ratios are not directly affected by changes in τRi , homogeneity of F i implies
that the relative demand for inputs Ki/Li is unchanged.
43See footnote 36.
44In the WRW framework, each tax has its own role to play. Therefore, when the tax structure is con-
strained, each tax is used separately to alleviate directly or indirectly the lack of available instruments,
while continuing to play its first-best role partially. See Wellisch (2006).
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provision of local public goods, since this would not directly influence capital location,
∂F iK/∂gi = 0. The only effect of local public good supply on the marginal productivity
of capital is through residents’ location responses. Thus, under perfect mobility of
households across small jurisdictions, local public goods are provided in accordance with
the Samuelson rule. As in the first-best case, decentralized provision of public goods
with property taxation provides local governments with the incentives to internalize the
preferences of residents.
However, condition (4.18) reveals that local governments distort their supply of local
public input. The LHS of (4.18) is the average distortion per capital unit caused by
an inefficient supply of local public inputs - compared to the Samuelson rule. The RHS
shows the direction of this distortion. The term F iKz+F
i
KW (∂Wi/∂zi)|(K¯i,L¯i) is the over-
all capital-augmenting impact of the public input - that is, the increase in the marginal
product of capital induced by an incremental amount of zi.45 Indeed, an additional unit
of the public factor increases F iK not just directly, as a technological complement to capi-
tal but also indirectly by attracting new workers who improve the productivity of capital
as well. Likewise, the other terms in square brackets represent the land-augmenting ef-
fect of zi. Hence, condition (4.18) states that public inputs are over(under)-provided,
i.e. F iz < (>)Ciz, when the capital-augmenting impact of the public input is stronger
(weaker) than its land-augmenting impact. To interpret this result, recall that property
taxation involves suboptimally high taxation of mobile capital relative to business land
from the jurisdiction’s standpoint (Proposition 2). In response, local authorities use pub-
lic factors to encourage capital location in their jurisdiction whilst not overly stimulating
land input demand. By so doing, they increase the capital share in the business property
κi, which allows them to compensate - at least in part - for the distortive effect of the
property tax.46 Finally, the elasticity εi in (4.18) reveals that the more τPi distorts κi,
the greater the distortion of the local public input. In other words, in jurisdictions where
business property taxation involves a stronger distortive effect, local authorities further
distort their public input supply to outweigh the first distortion. In summary, we have:
45The literature on public inputs distinguishes two categories of public factors depending on the
technology considered (Hillman 1978; McMillan 1979; Feehan 1989). This paper assumes "factor-
augmenting" public inputs (i.e. F i is CRS in private factors only), usually considered as the empirically
more relevant case. It implies that public inputs only increase private factors productivity unlike "firm-
augmenting" public inputs (i.e. F i is CRS in all factors) which also increase the firms’ profit. Comparing
the outcomes of these two specifications is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See Matsumoto
(1998) for such a comparison when public inputs are financed by a capital tax.
46Intuitively, condition (4.18) reads: the local public input is over(under)-provided if and only if it
allows jurisdiction i to attract capital(land)-intensive firms.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that local business taxes on capital and business land use are
combined into a single local business property tax. Then:
(i) local public goods are provided efficiently;
(ii) public inputs are over(under)-provided when the overall capital-augmenting impact
of the public input is stronger (weaker) than its overall land-augmenting impact.
This distortion increases with the sensitivity of the capital share in the business
property to changes in the property tax.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 is similar to the efficiency result derived in Wilson (1995) and
Richter and Wellisch (1996): under residents’ perfect mobility across atomistic jurisdic-
tions, when the tax instrument set consists of a direct tax on residents and a distortive
tax, local governments provide public goods efficiently.47 However, a novel finding from
this analysis is that due to competition between households and firms on land markets,
local authorities also do not distort household taxes when they can also tax business land
(Proposition 3). Intuitively, since the direct effect of establishing a business property
tax is to distort firms’ behavior, local authorities choose to use the instruments that
directly affect firms (τPi and zi) to tackle these distortions, while optimally choosing
household-oriented instruments (τRi and gi).
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 is in line with Matsumoto and Sugahara (2014). The
present study offers several novel insights. First, it reveals the balancing function of
local public inputs. The basic reason why local authorities distort their provision of
local public factors is to offset the distortions caused by the combined property tax -
which is too high (low) for a capital (business land) tax (Proposition 2).48 Second, we
find a distorting impact specific to workers’ mobility (or any untaxed mobile factor). To
make this intuitively transparent, suppose, for example, a community where both the
public input and workers involve a land-augmenting effect which dominates the capital-
augmenting effect: Eiz ≡ F iKz − F iLz < 0, and EiW ≡ F iKW − F iLW < 0. It follows
from (4.18) that the public inuput is under-provided and that higher labor mobility - an
increase in (∂Wi/∂zi)|(K¯i,L¯i) - exacerbates this under-provision. However, generally Eiz
and EiW need not have the same sign. Consequently, ignoring the mobility of labor and
other untaxed mobile factors might lead not only to overestimating or underestimating
the under-provision of zi, but might also predict a misleading over-provision. This last
point highlights the importance of workers’ interjurisdictional mobility and the type of
workers attracted by jurisdictions.49
47See also Proposition 4 in Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000).
48This result echoes the conclusions in Wellisch and Hulshorst (2000): when their tax instrument set
is constrained, regional governments balance the distortions among their available instruments.
49These considerations are not accounted for in Matsumoto and Sugahara (2014) since they do not
consider an untaxed mobile factor, ie. (∂Wi/∂zi)|(K¯i,L¯i) = 0.
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5. Conclusions
This paper extends the tax competition model with residents’-workers’ mobility devel-
oped by Wilson (1995) and Richter and Wellisch (1996), to account for the specific
context of sub-metropolitan jurisdictions, such as counties, municipalities, districts or
townships. It responds to Brülhart et al. (2015) which highlights the lack of theoret-
ical analysis of tax competition within metropolitan areas in the presence of mobile
households. We examined the level of public good and input provision financed by
multiple tax instruments, in an economy with residents, workers and capital mobility.
Households and firms interact on both the metropolitan labor market and the local land
markets, through their demand for local land. We showed that due to competition be-
tween households and firms on land markets, sub-metropolitan authorities are obliged
to choose continuously between hosting residents and hosting businesses. Two decen-
tralized equilibria have been analyzed. (1) When local governments freely choose a local
head tax on residents and two separate local business taxes on capital and land inputs,
the efficient allocation is achieved and reveals the existence of a marginal fiscal cost
caused by residents’ mobility. This cost is a new rationale for heavy reliance on house-
hold local taxes observed in practice apart from congestion costs which may actually
be quite low and difficult to measure by local authorities. (2) When local authorities
are constrained to use a combined business property tax, they charge inefficiently high
(low) taxation on capital (land) and use public inputs so as to compensate the dis-
tortive effects of the business property tax. Sub-metropolitan governments only distort
the firm-oriented instruments - property taxes and local public inputs - while optimally
choosing the household-oriented instruments - taxes on residents and local public goods.
Our analysis suggests that gains could be obtained of engaging local tax limitation
reforms that would involve a removal of capital from the property tax base in countries
where municipalities and other sub-metropolitan jurisdictions are constrained to make
use of combined business property taxes. Such reforms have been implemented in several
states of the United States (Illinois, 1979; Ohio, 2005; Michigan, 2014).50 The Taxe
professionnelle reform (France, 2010) also consisted of such a tax limitation. Empirical
evaluations of the outcomes of this type of reform on tax setting and public services
provision could shed an interesting light on tax competition at the sub-metropolitan
level.
Much remains to be done to develop our understanding of sub-metropolitan gov-
ernments’ behavior when facing a high degree of interjurisdictional mobility of both
households and firms. One weakness of our analysis is that, in modeling interactions
between jurisdictions, we have assumed perfect atomicity of communities. However,
it is typically the case that municipalities have some degree of market power due to
attachment of residents to home (Mansoorian and Myers, 1993) and commuting costs
50See Stafford and DeBoer (2014) for a detailed discussion of such reforms in the United States.
sub-metropolitan tax competition 25
(Braid, 2000). To our knowledge, there exists no theoretical investigation of such a
two-dimensional household imperfect mobility. This might however provide a more ac-
curate picture of how residential and labor mobility respectively affect local policies.
Especially, it could give further insights on how household imperfect mobility affect the
local trade-off between hosting households or firms and the extent to which local public
goods provision remains efficient in a second-best environment. Another weakness is
that in line with most of the existing literature, our analysis ignores dynamic aspects.
In reality, decisions made by local governments account for capital accumulation, and
local public debt constitutes an important part of municipal budgets. Accordingly, local
public policies are likely to be more subtle than our analysis suggests. A few recent stud-
ies have started to introduce dynamic issues in the traditional tax competition model
(Wildasin 2003, 2011) or in frameworks with imperfect household mobility (Han et al.,
2013).51 Integrating these two types of mobility could be a promising direction for future
research.
Appendix A
The basic purpose of this appendix is to prove Result 1.52 To this end, we assume that
the economy is characterized by the resource constraints (2.1)-(2.3) and that the agents
behave according to (2.4)-(2.11). Let us prove that a necessary and sufficient condition
for implementing the efficient allocation - defined by the constraints (2.1)-(2.4) and (3.1),
and the optimal conditions (3.2)-(3.6) - is that the instruments {τRi , τKi , τLi , gi, zi} satisfy
conditions (3.7)-(3.10).53
First, observe that in a decentralized economy households migrate at no cost and all
markets are clearing. Hence, the constraints (2.1)-(2.4) are satisfied. Besides, from the
resident’s budget constraint (2.6) and the zero-profit condition (2.10), it follows that
n∑
i=1
[F i −Rixi − Ci] =
n∑
i=1
[wWi + (r + τ
K
i )Ki + (ρi + τ
L
i )Li
−Ri(y − ρi − τRi )− Ci] = 0
where the last equality is obtained using the definition of the individual income (2.5)
and the local government budget constraint (2.11). Therefore, the feasibility constraint
of the economy (3.1) is satisfied. Also, noting that the wage rate w is the same in the
whole federation, it follows from (2.7) that condition (3.4) is ensured in equilibrium.
Let us now turn to the tax system. Inserting (2.6) for xi and (2.9) for ρi into both
sides of the condition for efficient allocation of residents (3.2) yields condition (3.7).
51See Keen and Konrad (2014) for a review of tax competition models with dynamic aspects.
52The proof follows the methological approach in Wellisch (2006) (Chapter 2).
53Note that, conditions (2.4), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) constitute 4 × (n − 1) equations. Thus, if the
problem is well-behaved, the 7n variables xi, gi, zi, Ri, Wi, Ki and Li are uniquely determined by the
7n conditions (2.1)-(2.4) and (3.1)-(3.6).
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This proves that conditions (3.2) and (3.7) are equivalent when allowing for private
behaviors. And, inserting (2.8) for F iK into (3.3) proves that the condition for efficient
capital allocation (3.3) and (3.8) are equivalent.
Finally, noting that the public services provision rules (3.5) and (3.6) are respectively
identical to (3.9) and (3.10) allows us to complete the proof.
Appendix B
B.1 Necessary conditions
This paragraph derives the first-order conditions of the local government (4.9). Differ-
entiating the local government’s objective (4.8) with respect to t ∈ {τ ; τK ; g; z} and the
conditions for the optimal inputs demand (2.7)-(2.9), it follows that
dΩ
dt
= τRt + τ
KKt − Cggt + (Fz − Cz)zt +R(FLt + τt) = 0 (A.1)
where subscripts stand for derivatives.54 Besides, differentiating the migration equilib-
rium (4.5), we have
FLt + τt =
UR
Ux
Rt +
Ug
Ux
gt (A.2)
Inserting (A.2) into (A.1), the first-order conditions (4.9) result.
B.2 Location responses
We now derive the location responses of residents, workers and capital to local policy
changes. First, note that since F exhibits constant returns to scale in the private factors,
Euler’s theorem requires that F = WFW +KFK + LFL. Differentiating this condition
with respect to W , K, L and z yields
WFWW +KFWK + LFWL = 0 (A.3)
WFKW +KFKK + LFKL = 0 (A.4)
WFLW +KFLK + LFLL = 0 (A.5)
WFzW +KFzK + LFzL = Fz (A.6)
Differentiating the equilibrium conditions (4.3)-(4.5) with respect to t ∈ {τ, τK , g, z}, it
follows thatFWW −FWL FWKFKW −FKL FKK
FLW −FLL − URUx FLK

WtRt
Kt
 =
 −FWzztτKt − FKzzt
−τt + UgUx gt − FLzzt
 (A.7)
54In the following appendices, the jurisdiction index i is dropped for notational convenience.
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Let A denote the first matrix on the LHS of (A.7).55 Performing the row operation
r3 ←Wr1 +Kr2 + Lr3 (A.8)
on the third row of |A|, and using (A.3)-(A.5) yields
|A| = UR
Ux
D
where D =
∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWKFKW FKK
∣∣∣∣∣.56 It will prove useful in the sequel to notice that
D = − L
W
∣∣∣∣∣FWL FWKFKL FKK
∣∣∣∣∣ = − LK
∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWLFKW FKL
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0 (A.9)
The first (second) equality of (A.9) is obtained applying the column operation c1(c2)←
W
L c1 +
K
L c2 to the first (second) column of D.
57
Let us now derive the migration responses of residents. Applying Cramer’s rule to
(A.7), it comes
Rt =
Ux
URD
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW −FWzzt FWK
FKW τ
K
t − FKzzt FKK
FLW −τt + UgUx gt − FLzzt FLK
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Using the row operation (A.8) and equalities (A.3),(A.4) and (A.6), we obtain
Rt = Gt
Ux
UR
(A.10)
where Gt ≡ τt − KL τKt − UgUx gt + FzL zt. It follows that
Rτ =
Ux
UR
, RτK = −
K
L
Ux
UR
, Rg = − Ug
UR
, Rz =
Ux
UR
Fz
L
. (A.11)
which proves the signs of the responses Rt, t ∈ {τ ; τK ; g; z} in Lemma 2.58
Identically,
Wt =
Ux
URD
[
Gt
∣∣∣∣∣FWL FWKFKL FKK
∣∣∣∣∣+ URUx
∣∣∣∣∣ −FWzzt FWKτKt − FKzzt FKK
∣∣∣∣∣
]
(A.12)
55Notice that from Schwarz’s theorem, ∀X,Y ∈ {W ;K;L}, FXY = FYX .
56To solve (A.7) for Wt, Rt and Kt, the determinant |A| must be nonzero which is the case since
UR < 0 due to congestion, and D > 0 (see below).
57The derivations make extensive use of the following calculation rule for determinants:
|c1 . . . cj . . . cp| = 1αj |c1 . . .
∑p
k=1 αkck
(column j)
. . . cp|, where cj is the jth column vector. Since | At | = |A|,
the same rule applies to row operations.
58To establish the signs of the location responses, recall that: Ux > 0, Ug > 0, UR < 0, FX > 0,
FXX < 0 and FXY > 0 for all X and Y in {W ;K;L; z}.
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Inserting (A.9) into (A.12) yields
Wt = −GtW
L
Ux
UR
+
1
D
∣∣∣∣∣ −FWzzt FWKτKt − FKzzt FKK
∣∣∣∣∣
The location responses of workers are thus given by
Wτ = −W
L
Ux
UR
, WτK =
KW
L2
Ux
UR
− FWK
D
,
Wg =
W
L
Ug
UR
, Wz = −W
L2
Fz
Ux
UR
+
FWKFKz − FKKFWz
D
.
(A.13)
which proves the signs of the responses Wt, t ∈ {τ ; τK ; g; z} in Lemma 2. Notice that
the signs of the responses (A.13) are unambiguous, since D > 0 from (A.9).
Finally, the same calculations give
Kt = −GtK
L
Ux
UR
+
1
D
∣∣∣∣∣FWW −FWzztFKW τKt − FKzzt
∣∣∣∣∣
so that,
Kτ = −K
L
Ux
UR
, KτK =
(
K
L
)2 Ux
UR
+
FWW
D
,
Kg =
K
L
Ug
UR
, Kz = −K
L2
Fz
Ux
UR
+
FKWFWz − FWWFKz
D
.
(A.14)
which proves the signs of the responses Kt, t ∈ {τ ; τK ; g; z} in Lemma 2.
Appendix C
The basic purpose of this appendix is to prove Result 2. From the first order condition
(4.9), (
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
Rτ + τ
KKτ = 0 (A.1)(
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
RτK + τ
KKτK = 0 (A.2)(
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
Rg + τ
KKg +R
Ug
Ux
− Cg = 0 (A.3)(
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
Rz + τ
KKz + Fz − Cz = 0 (A.4)
Yet, using (A.11) and (A.14) yields∣∣∣∣∣ Rτ KτRτK KτK
∣∣∣∣∣ = UxUR FWWD 6= 0
Then, equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply
τ +R
UR
Ux
= 0 (A.5)
τK = 0 (A.6)
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which proves the optimal taxation rules (4.10) and (4.11), recalling that τ = τR − τL.
Inserting (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.3) and (A.4), the Samuelson rules (4.12) and (4.13)
follow.
Finally, using (A.5) and (A.6) to substitute τ and τK into the local budget constraint
(4.6) yields the optimal condition for τL (4.14).
Appendix D
D.1 Locational system
The basic purpose of this appendix is to prove Result 3. Using (4.15) to substitute for
τP into (4.4), the locational system becomes
FW (W,K,L −R, z)− w = 0 (A.1)
FK(W,K,L −R, z) + τR− C
K + L − r = 0 (A.2)
U [y¯ − FL(W,K,L −R, z)− τ, g, R]− u¯ = 0 (A.3)
Differentiating (A.1)-(A.3) with respect to t ∈ {τ, g, z}, it follows that

FWW −FWL FWK
FKW −FKL + τK+L FKK + τ
P
K+L
FLW −FLL − URUx FLK

WtRt
Kt

=

−FWzzt
− RK+Lτt + CgK+Lgt +
(
Cz
K+L − FKz
)
zt
−τt + UgUx gt − FLzzt
 (A.4)
Let B denote the first matrix on the LHS of (A.4).
D.2 Household taxation rules
Let us start with the choice of τ whose second-best value is determined by the necessary
condition (4.9), where τP replaces τK :(
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
Rτ + τ
PKτ = 0 (A.5)
As in the first-best case, Cramer’s rule is used to solve for Rτ and Kτ from (A.4).
Inserting these expressions into (A.5), the first-order condition becomes
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(
τ +R
UR
Ux
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW 0 FWK
FKW − RK+L FKK + τ
P
K+L
FLW −1 FLK
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ τP
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW −FWL 0
FKW −FKL + 1K+L
(
τ +RURUx
)
− RK+L URUx − RK+L
FLW −FLL − URUx −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Noting that the terms τ
P
K+L and
1
K+L
(
τ +RURUx
)
cancel each other and applying the
row operation (A.8) to both determinants, it follows that
(
τ +R
UR
Ux
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW 0 FWK
FKW − RK+L FKK
0 α 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ τP
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW −FWL 0
FKW −FKL − RK+L URUx − RK+L
0 αURUx α
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
where α = KRK+L + L. Operating r2 ← r2 + 1α RK+Lr3 on the right determinant, and
developing the resulting determinants yields
(
τ +R
UR
Ux
)
D + τP
∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWLFKW FKL
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (A.6)
Dividing (A.6) by D and using (A.9), it comes
τ +R
UR
Ux
− K
L
τP = 0 (A.7)
which proves the second-best taxation rule (4.16).
Finally, using (A.7) to substitute τ into the local budget constraint (4.15) yields the
optimal condition for τP (4.19).
D.3 Public good provision rule
Consider now the choice of g. Replacing τR + URUx from the second-best taxation rule
(A.7) into (4.9), it follows that
τP
(
K
L
Rg +Kg
)
+R
Ug
Ux
− Cg = 0 (A.8)
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Using again Cramer’s rule and inverting the last two columns in the expression of Rg,
it comes
Rg = −|B|−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW FWK 0
FKW FKK +
τP
K+L
Cg
K+L
FLW FLK
Ug
Ux
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
Kg = −|B|−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW FWL 0
FKW FKL − τK+L CgK+L
FLW FLL +
UR
Ux
Ug
Ux
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
and operating c2 ← −c2 + KL c3 on the second column of |B|, we obtain
|B| = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW γ
W FWK
FKW γ
K − 1K+L
(
τ − KL τP
)
FKK +
τP
K+L
FLW γ
L + URUx FLK
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where γW ≡ KL FWK + FWL, γK ≡ KL FKK + FKL and γL ≡ KL FLK + FLL. Multiplying
(A.8) by−|B|, introducing the explicit forms ofRg,Kg and |B|, and adding determinants
yields ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW γ
W ΓFWK
FKW γ
K − 1K+L
(
τ − KL τP
)
Γ
(
FKK +
τP
K+L
)
+ τP
Cg
K+L
FLW γ
L + URUx ΓFLK + τ
P Ug
Ux
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
where Γ ≡ RUgUx − Cg has been introduced for convenience. Operating c2 ← c2 + WL c1,
using Euler’s expressions (A.3)-(A.5) and condition (A.7) to simplify terms, it follows
that ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW 0 ΓFWK
FKW
R
K+L
UR
Ux
ΓFKK +
τP
K+LR
Ug
Ux
FLW
UR
Ux
ΓFLK + τ
P Ug
Ux
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Performing r2 ← Wr1 + (K + L)r2 − Rr3, simplifying from (A.3)-(A.5) and collecting
terms, we obtain (
R
Ug
Ux
− Cg
) ∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWKFKW − FLW FKK − FLK
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (A.9)
It is straightforward to derive from (A.9) that the determinant in (A.9) equals K+LL D 6=
0. This proves the Samuelson rule (4.17).
D.4 Public input provision rule
Finally, let us prove the second-best public choice rule for z. This proof follows rigorously
the same computation steps as in the derivation of the second-best public good provision
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rule. Therefore, we provide only the main steps of the proof. As, above, we start with
replacing τR + URUx from (A.7) into (4.9), which yields
τP
(
K
L
Rz +Kz
)
+ Fz − Cz = 0 (A.10)
Then, applying Cramer’s rule to get explicit forms for Rz and Kz, integrating them into
(A.10) and operating c2 ← c2 + WL c1, it follows that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
FWW 0 ΛFWK − τPFWz
FKW
R
K+L
UR
Ux
ΛFKK + τ
P
(
Fz
K+L − FKz
)
FLW
UR
Ux
ΛFLK + τ
PFLz
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
where Λ ≡ Fz − Cz. Performing r2 ←Wr1 + (K + L)r2 +Rr3, simplifying terms using
(A.3)-(A.6) and collecting terms, we obtain
(Fz − Cz)
∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWKFKW − FLW FKK − FLK
∣∣∣∣∣
− τP
∣∣∣∣∣FWW FWzFKW − FLW FKz − FLz
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Since the first determinant in (A.9) equals K+LL D 6= 0 from (A.9). Straightforward
manipulations yield
Fz − Cz = τP L
K + L
FWW
D
[
FKz − FLz − FWz
FWW
(FKW − FLW )
]
(A.11)
Notice that differentiating (A.1), given the equilibrium values K¯ and L¯, yields
∂W
∂z
∣∣∣∣
(K¯,L¯)
= − FWz
FWW
> 0 (A.12)
Besides, the elasticity of the capital share in the overall business property with respect
to property tax changes writes
ε = τP
K + L
K
(
K
K + L
)
τP
= τP
L
K + L
1
K
(
KτP +
K
L
RτP
)
(A.13)
where the second equality is obtained by recalling that LτP = −RτP from the land
market clearing condition (2.3). And, replacing τK by τP and τ by τR − τP into the
locational system (4.3)-(4.5) allows to derive by differentiation,
RτP = −
K + L
L
Ux
UR
and KτP =
FWW
D
+
K(K + L)
L2
Ux
UR
Integrating these expressions into (A.13) yields
ε = τP
L
K + L
FWW
D
< 0 (A.14)
Finally, inserting (A.12) and (A.14) into (A.11), the optimal second-best condition (4.18)
follows.
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